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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new neighborhood semantics for contingency logic,
by introducing a simple property in standard neighborhood models. This simpli-
fies the neighborhood semantics given in Fan and van Ditmarsch [4], but does
not change the set of valid formulas. Under this perspective, among various no-
tions of bisimulation and respective Hennessy-Milner Theorems, we show that
c-bisimulation is equivalent to nbh-∆-bisimulation in the literature, which guides
us to understand the essence of the latter notion. This perspective also provides
various frame definability and axiomatization results.
Keywords: contingency logic, neighborhood semantics, bisimulation, frame definabil-
ity, axiomatization
1 Introduction
Under Kripke semantics, contingency logic (CL for short) is non-normal, less express-
ive than standard modal logic (ML for short), and the five basic frame properties (seri-
ality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, Eucludicity) cannot be defined in CL. This
makes the axiomatizations of CL nontrivial: although there have been a mountain of
work on the axiomatization problem since the 1960s [9–12, 15], over K, D, T , 4, 5
and any combinations thereof, no method in the cited work can uniformly handle all
the five basic frame properties. This job has not been addressed until in [5], which also
contains an axiomatization of CL on B and its multi-modal version. This indicates that
Kripke semantics may not be suitable for CL.
Partly inspired by the above motivation (in particular, the non-normality of CL),
and partly by a weaker logical omniscience in Kripke semantics (namely, all theor-
ems are known to be true or known to be false), a neighborhood semantics for CL is
proposed in [4], which interprets the non-contingency operator ∆ in a way such that
its philosophical intuition, viz. necessarily true or necessarily false, holds. However,
under this (old) semantics, as shown in [4], CL is still less expressive thanML on vari-
ous classes of neighborhood models, and many usual neighborhood frame properties
∗This research is supported by the youth project 17CZX053 of National Social Science Fundation of
China. The author thanks Yanjing Wang for proposing the notion of quasi-filter structures and discussing
on earlier versions of this manuscript. Thanks also go to two anonymous referees of NCML 2017 for their
insightful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of the manuscript was presented on the conference
of NCML 2017 at Zhejiang University in Oct. 2017.
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are undefinable in CL. Moreover, based on this semantics, [1] proposes a bisimulation
(called ‘nbh-∆-bisimulation’ there) to characterize CL within ML and within first-
order logic (FOL for short), but the essence of the bisimulation seems not quite clear.
In retrospect, no matter whether the semantics forCL is Kripke-style or neigborhood-
style in the sense of [4], there is an asymmetry between the syntax and models of CL:
on the one hand, the language is too weak, since it is less expressive than ML over
various model classes; on the other hand, the models are too strong, since its models
are the same as those ofML. This makes it hard to handle CL.1
Inspired by [6], we simplify the neighborhood semantics for CL in [4], and mean-
while keep the logic (valid formulas) the same by restricting models. This can weaken
the too strong models so as to balance the syntax and models for CL. Under this new
perspective, we can gain a lot of things, for example, bisimulation notions and their cor-
responding Hennessy-Milner Theorems, and frame definability. Moreover, we show
that one of bisimulation notions is equivalent to the notion of nbh-∆-bisimulation,
which helps us understand the essence of nbh-∆-bisimulation. We also obtain some
simple axiomatizations.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Language and old neighborhood semantics
First, we introduce the language and the old neighborhood semantics of CL. Fix a
countable set Prop of propositional variables. The language of CL, denoted L∆, is an
extension of propositional logic with a sole primitive modality∆, where p ∈ Prop.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ∆ϕ
∆ϕ is read “it is non-contingent that ϕ”. ∇ϕ, read “it is contingent that ϕ”, abbreviates
¬∆ϕ.
A neighborhood model for L∆ is defined as that for the language of ML. That is,
to sayM = 〈S,N, V 〉 is a neighborhood model, if S is a nonempty set of states, N :
S → 22
S
is a neighborhood function assigning each state in S a set of neighborhoods,
and V : Prop→ 2S is a valuation assigning each propositional variable in Prop a set
of states in which it holds. A neighborhood frame is a neighborhood model without
any valuation.
There are a variety of neighborhood properties. The following list is taken from [4,
Def. 3].
Definition 1 (Neighborhood properties).
(n): N(s) contains the unit, if S ∈ N(s).
(r): N(s) contains its core, if
⋂
N(s) ∈ N(s).
(i): N(s) is closed under intersections, if X,Y ∈ N(s) impliesX ∩ Y ∈ N(s).
(s): N(s) is supplemented, or closed under supersets, ifX ∈ N(s) andX ⊆ Y ⊆
S implies Y ∈ N(s). We also call this property ‘monotonicity’.
(c): N(s) is closed under complements, if X ∈ N(s) implies S\X ∈ N(s).
(d): X ∈ N(s) implies S\X /∈ N(s).
(t): X ∈ N(s) implies s ∈ X .
(b): s ∈ X implies {u ∈ S | S\X /∈ N(u)} ∈ N(s).
1Analogous problem occurs in the setting of knowing-value logic [13, 14].
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(4): X ∈ N(s) implies {u ∈ S | X ∈ N(u)} ∈ N(s).
(5): X /∈ N(s) implies {u ∈ S | X /∈ N(u)} ∈ N(s).
Frame F = 〈S,N〉 (and the corresponding model) possesses such a property P,
if N(s) has the property P for each s ∈ S, and we call the frame (resp. the model)
P-frame (resp. P-model).
Given a neighborhood model M = 〈S,N, V 〉 and s ∈ S, the old neighborhood
semantics of L∆ [4] is defined as follows, where ϕM = {t ∈ S | M, t  ϕ}.
M, s  p iff s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ iff M, s 1 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  ∆ϕ iff ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s)
2.2 Existing results on old neighborhood semantics
Under the above old neighborhood semantics, it is shown in [4, Props.2-7] that on
the class of (t)-models or the class of (c)-models, L∆ is equally expressive as L;
however, on other class of models in Def. 1, L∆ is less expressive than L; moreover,
none of frame properties in the above list is definable in CL.
Based on the above semantics for CL, a notion of bisimulation is proposed in [1],
which is inspired by the definition of precocongruences in [8] and the old neighbour-
hood semantics of∆.
Definition 2 (nbh-∆-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be
neighborhood models. A nonempty relation Z ⊆ S × S′ is a nbh-∆-bisimulation
betweenM andM′, if for all (s, s′) ∈ Z ,
(Atoms) s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ Prop;
(Coherence) if the pair (U,U ′) is Z-coherent,2 then
(U ∈ N(s) or S\U ∈ N(s)) iff (U ′ ∈ N ′(s′) or S′\U ′ ∈ N ′(s′)).
(M, s) and (M′, s′) is nbh-∆-bisimilar, notation (M, s) ∼∆ (M
′, s′), if there is a
nbh-∆-bisimulation betweenM andM′ containing (s, s′).3
Although it is inspired by both the definition of precocongruences in [8] and the
old neighbourhood semantics of ∆, the essence of nbh-∆-bisimulation seems not so
clear.
It is then proved that Hennessy-Milner Theorem holds for nbh-∆-bisimulation. For
this, a notion of∆-saturated model is required.
Definition 3 (∆-saturatedmodel). [1, Def. 11] LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhood
model. A setX ⊆ S is∆-compact, if every set ofL∆-formulas that is finitely satisfiable
inX is itself also satisfiable inX .M is said to be∆-saturated, if for all s ∈ S and all
≡L∆-closed neighborhoodsX ∈ N(s), bothX and S\X are ∆-compact.
Theorem 4 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem for nbh-∆-bisimulation). [1, Thm.1] On ∆-
saturated modelsM andM′ and states s inM and s′ inM′, if (M, s) ≡L∆ (M
′, s′),
then (M, s) ∼∆ (M′, s′).
2Let R be a binary relation. We say (U, U ′) is R-coherent, if for any (x, y) ∈ R, we have x ∈ U iff
y ∈ U ′. We say U is R-closed, if (U,U) is R-coherent. It is obvious that (∅, ∅) is R-coherent for any R.
3In fact, the notion of nbh-∆-bisimilarity is defined in a more complex way in [1]. It is easy to show that
our definition is equivalent to, but simpler than, that one.
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3 A new semantics for CL
As mentioned above, there is an asymmetry between the syntax and neighborhood
models of CL, which makes it hard to tackle CL. In this section, we propose a new
neighborhood semantics for this logic. This semantics is simpler than the old one, but
the two semantics are equivalent in that their logics (valid formulas) are the same.
The new neighborhood semantics  and the old one  differ only in the case of
non-contingency operator.
M, s  ∆ϕ iff ϕM ∈ N(s),
where ϕM = {t ∈ M | M, t  ϕ}. To say two models with the same domain are
pointwise equivalent, if every world in both models satisfies the same formulas.
We hope that although we change the semantics, the validities are still kept the
same as the old one. So how to make it out? Recall that non-contingency means
necessarily true or necessarily false, which implies that ∆p ↔ ∆¬p should be valid.
However, although the formula is indeed valid under the old neighborhood semantics,
it is invalid under the new one. In order to make this come about, we need make some
restriction to the models. Look at a proposition first.
Proposition 5. Under the new semantics,∆p↔ ∆¬p defines the property (c).
Proof. Let F = 〈S,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
First, suppose F possesses (c), we need to show F  ∆p ↔ ∆¬p. For this,
assume any modelM based on F and s ∈ S such thatM, s  ∆p, thus pM ∈ N(s).
By (c), S\pM ∈ N(s), i.e., (¬p)M ∈ N(s), which means exactly M, s  ∆¬p.
Now assumeM, s  ∆¬p, we have (¬p)M ∈ N(s), that is S\pM ∈ N(s). By (c),
S\(S\pM) ∈ N(s), i.e. pM ∈ N(s), and thusM, s  ∆p. HenceM, s  ∆p ↔
∆¬p, and therefore F  ∆p↔ ∆¬p.
Conversely, suppose F does not possess (c), we need to show F 6 ∆p ↔ ∆¬p.
By supposition, there exists X such that X ∈ N(s) but S\X /∈ N(s). Define a
valuation V on F as V (p) = X . We have now pM = V (p) ∈ N(s), thusM, s  ∆p.
On the other side, V (¬p) = S\X /∈ N(s), thusM, s 6 ∆¬p. HenceM, s 6 ∆p→
∆¬p, and therefore F 6 ∆p↔ ∆¬p.
This means that in order to guarantee the validity∆p↔ ∆¬p under new semantics,
we (only) need to ‘force’ the model to have the property (c). Thus from now on, we
assume (c) to be the minimal condition of a neighborhood model, and call this type of
model ‘c-models’.
Definition 6 (c-structures). A model is a c-model, if it has the property (c); intuitively,
if a proposition is non-contingent at a state in the domain, so is its negation. A frame
is a c-frame, if the models based on it are c-models.
The following proposition states that on c-models, the new neighborhood semantics
and the old one coincide with each other in terms of L∆ satisfiability.
Proposition 7. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a c-model. Then for all ϕ ∈ L∆, for all s ∈ S,
we haveM, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ, i.e., ϕM = ϕM .
Proof. By induction on ϕ ∈ L∆. The only nontrivial case is∆ϕ.
First, supposeM, s  ∆ϕ, then ϕM ∈ N(s). By induction hypothesis, ϕM ∈
N(s). Of course, ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). This entails thatM, s  ∆ϕ.
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Conversely, assumeM, s  ∆ϕ, then ϕM ∈ N(s) or (¬ϕ)M ∈ N(s). Since
M is a c-model, we can obtain ϕM ∈ N(s). By induction hypothesis, ϕM ∈ N(s).
Therefore,M, s  ∆ϕ.
Definition 8 (c-variation). Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a neighborhood model. We say
c(M) is a c-variation of M, if c(M) = 〈S, cN, V 〉, where for all s ∈ S, cN(s) =
{X ⊆ S : X ∈ N(s) or S\X ∈ N(s)}.
The definition of cN is very natural, in that just as “X ∈ N(s) or S\X ∈ N(s)”
corresponds to the old semantics of ∆, X ∈ cN(s) corresponds to the new semantics
of∆. It is easy to see that every neighborhood model has a sole c-variation, that every
such c-variation is a c-model, and moreover, for any neighborhood modelM, ifM is
already a c-model, then c(M) =M.
Proposition 9. LetM be a neighborhood model. Then for all ϕ ∈ L∆, for all s ∈ M,
we haveM, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ c(M), s  ϕ, i.e., ϕM = ϕc(M).
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ, where the only nontrivial case is∆ϕ. We have
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s) or S\(ϕM) ∈ N(s)
IH
⇐⇒ ϕc(M) ∈ N(s) or S\(ϕc(M)) ∈ N(s)
Def.cN
⇐⇒ ϕc(M) ∈ cN(s)
⇐⇒ c(M), s  ∆ϕ
Let Γ c ϕ denote that Γ entails ϕ over the class of all c-models, i.e., for each
c-modelM and each s ∈ M, ifM, s  ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ, thenM, s  ϕ. With
Props. 7 and 9 in hand, we obtain immediately that
Corollary 10. For all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L∆, Γ c ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ  ϕ. Therefore, for all
ϕ ∈ L∆,c ϕ ⇐⇒  ϕ.
In this way, we strengthened the expressive power of CL, since it is now equally
expressive asML, and kept the logic (valid formulas) the same as the old neighborhood
semantics. The noncontingency operator∆ can now be seen as a package of  and∆
in the old neighborhood semantics; under the new neighborhood semantics, on the one
hand, it is interpreted just as ; on the other hand, it retains the validity∆p↔ ∆¬p.
4 c-Bisimulation
Recall that the essence of the notion of nbh-∆-bisimulation proposed in [1] is not so
clear. In this section, we introduce a notion of c-bisimulation, and show that this notion
is equivalent to nbh-∆-bisimulation. The c-bisimulation is inspired by both Prop. 5 and
the definition of precocongruences in [8, Prop. 3.16]. Intuitively, the notion is obtained
by just adding the property (c) into the notion of precocongruences.
Definition 11 (c-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be c-
models. A nonempty relation Z ⊆ S × S′ is a c-bisimulation betweenM andM′, if
for all (s, s′) ∈ Z ,
(i) s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ Prop;
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(ii) if the pair (U,U ′) is Z-coherent, then U ∈ N(s) iff U ′ ∈ N ′(s′).
We say (M, s) and (M′, s′) are c-bisimilar, written (M, s)↔c (M′, s′), if there is a
c-bisimulation Z betweenM andM′ such that (s, s′) ∈ Z .
Note that both c-bisimulation and c-bisimilarity are defined between c-models,
rather than between any neighborhood models. L∆ formulas are invariant under c-
bisimilarity.
Proposition 12. Let M and M′ be c-models, s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′. If (M, s) ↔c
(M′, s′), then for all ϕ ∈ L∆,M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ.
Proof. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be both c-models. By induction
on ϕ ∈ L∆. The nontrivial case is∆ϕ.
M, s  ∆ϕ
⇐⇒ ϕM ∈ N(s)
(∗)
⇐⇒ ϕM
′
∈ N ′(s′)
⇐⇒ M′, s′  ∆ϕ.
(∗) follows from the fact that (ϕM, ϕM
′
) is↔c-coherent plus the condition (ii) of c-
bisimulation. To see why (ϕM, ϕM
′
) is↔c-coherent, the proof goes as follows: if for
any (x, x′) ∈↔c, i.e., (M, x) ↔c (M′, x′), then by induction hypothesis,M, x  ϕ
iffM′, x′  ϕ, i.e., x ∈ ϕM iff x′ ∈ ϕM
′
.
Now we are ready to show the Hennessy-Milner Theorem for c-bisimulation. Since
c-bisimulation is defined between c-models, we need also to add the property c into the
notion of∆-saturated models in Def. 3.
Definition 13 (∆-saturated c-model). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a c-model. A set X ⊆ S
is ∆-compact, if every set of L∆-formulas that is finitely satisfiable in X is itself also
satisfiable in X . M is said to be ∆-saturated, if for all s ∈ S and all ≡L∆ -closed
neighborhoodX ∈ N(s), X is∆-compact.4
In the above definition of∆-saturated c-model, we write “X is∆-compact”, rather
than “bothX and S\X are∆-compact”, since under the condition thatX ∈ N(s) and
the property (c), these two statements are equivalent. Thus each ∆-saturated c-model
must be a ∆-saturated model.
We will demonstrate that on ∆-saturated c-models, L∆-equivalence implies c-
bisimilarity, for which we prove that the notion of c-bisimulation is equivalent to that
of nbh-∆-bisimulation, in the sense that every nbh-∆-bisimulation (between neighbor-
hood models) is a c-bisimulation (between c-models), and vice versa. By doing so, we
can see clearly the essence of nbh-∆-bisimulation, i.e. precocongruenceswith property
(c).
Proposition 14. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be neighborhood mod-
els. If Z is a nbh-∆-bisimulation between M and M′, then Z is a c-bisimulation
between c(M) and c(M′).
4Note that we do not distinguish ≡L∆ here from that in Def. 3 despite different neighborhood semantics.
This is because as we show in Prop. 7, on c-models the two neighborhood semantics are the same in terms
of L∆ satisfiability. Thus it does not matter which semantics is involved in the current context.
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Proof. Suppose that Z is a nbh-∆-bisimulation betweenM and M′, to show Z is a
c-bisimulation between c(M) and c(M′).
First, one can easily verify that c(M) and c(M′) are both c-models.
Second, assume that (s, s′) ∈ Z . SinceM and c(M) have the same domain and
valuation, item (i) can be obtained from the supposition and (Atoms). For item (ii),
let (U,U ′) be Z-coherent. We need to show that U ∈ cN(s) iff U ′ ∈ cN ′(s′). For
this, we have the following line of argumentation: U ∈ cN(s) iff (by definition of cN )
(U ∈ N(s) or S\U ∈ N(s)) iff (by (Coherence)) iff (U ′ ∈ N ′(s′) or S′\U ′ ∈ N ′(s′))
iff (by definition of cN ′) U ′ ∈ cN ′(s′).
Proposition 15. Let M = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be c-models. If Z is a
c-bisimulation betweenM andM′, then Z is a nbh-∆-bisimulation betweenM and
M′.
Proof. Suppose that Z is a c-bisimulation between c-modelsM andM′, to show Z is
a nbh-∆-bisimulation betweenM andM′. Assume that (s, s′) ∈ Z , we only need to
show (Atoms) and (Coherence) holds. (Atoms) is clear from (i).
For (Coherence), let the pair (U,U ′) isZ-coherent. Then by (ii),U ∈ N(s) iff U ′ ∈
N ′(s′). We also have that (S\U, S′\U ′) is Z-coherent. Using (ii) again, we infer that
S\U ∈ N(s) iff S′\U ′ ∈ N ′(s′). Therefore, (U ∈ N(s) or S\U ∈ N(s)) iff
(U ′ ∈ N ′(s′) or S′\U ′ ∈ N ′(s′)), as desired.
Since every c-variation of a c-model is just the model itself, by Props. 14 and 15,
we obtain immediately that
Corollary 16. Let M = (S,N, V ) and M′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be both c-models. Then
Z is a c-bisimulation betweenM andM′ iff Z is an nbh-∆-bisimulation betweenM
andM′.
Theorem 17 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem for c-bisimulation). Let M and M′ be ∆-
saturated c-models, and s ∈ M, s′ ∈ M′. If for all ϕ ∈ L∆, M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒
M′, s′  ϕ, then (M, s)↔c (M′, s′).
Proof. Suppose M and M′ are ∆-saturated c-models such that for all ϕ ∈ L∆,
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ. By Prop. 7, we have that for all ϕ ∈ L∆, M, s 
ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ. Since each ∆-saturated c-model is a ∆-saturated model, by
Hennessy-Milner Theorem of nbh-∆-bisimulation (Thm. 4), we obtain (M, s) ∼∆
(M′, s′). Then by Coro. 16, we conclude that (M, s)↔c (M′, s′).
5 Monotonic c-bisimulation
This section proposes a notion of bisimulation for CL over monotonic, c-models. This
notion can be obtained via two ways: one is to add the property of monotonicity (s)
into c-bisimulation, the other is to add the property (c) into monotonic bisimulation (for
ML).5 For the sake of reference, we call the notion obtained by the first way ‘monotonic
c-bisimulation’, and that obtained by the second way ‘c-monotonic bisimulation’. We
will show that the two notions are indeed the same.
5For the notion of monotonic bisimulation, refer to [7, Def. 4.10].
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Definition 18 (Monotonic c-bisimulation). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉
be both monotonic, c-models. A nonempty binary relationZ is amonotonic c-bisimulation
betweenM andM′, if sZs′ implies the following:
(i) s and s′ satisfy the same propositional variables;
(ii) If (U,U ′) is Z-coherent, then U ∈ N(s) iff U ′ ∈ N ′(s′).
(M, s) and (M′, s′) is said to be monotonic c-bisimilar, written (M, s) ↔sc
(M′, s′), if there is a monotonic c-bisimulation betweenM andM′ such that sZs′.
Definition 19 (c-monotonic bisimulation). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉
be both monotonic, c-models. A nonempty binary relation Z is a c-monotonic bisimu-
lation betweenM andM′, if sZs′ implies the following:
(Prop) s and s′ satisfy the same propositional variables;
(c-m-Zig) if X ∈ N(s), then there exists X ′ ∈ N ′(s′) such that for all x′ ∈ X ′,
there is an x ∈ X such that xZx′;
(c-m-Zag) if X ′ ∈ N ′(s′), then there exists X ∈ N(s) such that for all x ∈ X ,
there is an x′ ∈ X ′ such that xZx′.
(M, s) and (M′, s′) is said to be c-monotonic bisimilar, written (M, s) ↔cs
(M′, s′), if there is a c-monotonic bisimulation betweenM andM′ such that sZs′.
Note that both monotonic c-bisimulation and c-monotonic bisimulation are defined
between monotonic, c-models.
Proposition 20. Every c-monotonic bisimulation is a monotonic c-bisimulation.
Proof. Suppose that Z is a c-monotonic bisimulation between M and M′, both of
which are monotonic, c-models, to show that Z is also a monotonic c-bisimulation
betweenM andM′. For this, assume that sZs′, it suffices to show the condition (ii).
Assume that (U,U ′) is Z-coherent. If U ∈ N(s), by (c-m-Zig), there exists X ′ ∈
N ′(s′) such that for all x′ ∈ X ′, there is a x ∈ U such that xZx′. By assumption
and x ∈ U and xZx′, we have x′ ∈ U ′, thus X ′ ⊆ U ′. Then by (s) and X ′ ∈
N ′(s′), we conclude that U ′ ∈ N ′(s′). The converse is similar, but by using (c-m-Zag)
instead.
Proposition 21. Every monotonic c-bisimulation is a c-monotonic bisimulation.
Proof. Suppose that Z is a monotonic c-bisimulation between M and M′, both of
which are monotonic, c-models, to show that Z is also a c-monotonic bisimulation
betweenM andM′. For this, given that sZs′, we need to show the condition (c-m-
Zig) and (c-m-Zag). We show (c-m-Zig) only, since (c-m-Zag) is similar.
Assume that X ∈ N(s), define X ′ = {x′ | xZx′ for some x ∈ X}. It suffices to
show that X ′ ∈ N ′(s′). The proof is as follows: by assumption and monotonicity of
M, we have S ∈ N(s), then by (c), ∅ ∈ N(s). Since (∅, ∅) is Z-coherent, by (ii), we
infer ∅ ∈ N ′(s′). From this and monotonicity ofM′, it follows that X ′ ∈ N ′(s′), as
desired.
As a corollary, the aforementioned two ways enable us to get the same bisimulation
notion.
Corollary 22. The notion of monotonic c-bisimulation is equal to the notion of c-
monotonic bisimulation.
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So we can choose either of the two bisimulation notions to refer to the notion of
bisimulation of CL over monotonic, c-models. In the sequel, we choose the simpler
one, that is, monotonic c-bisimulation. One may easily see that this notion is stronger
than monotonic bisimulation (forML).
Similar to the case for c-bisimulation in Sec. 4, we can show that
Proposition 23. Let M and M′ be monotonic, c-models, s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′. If
(M, s)↔sc (M
′, s′), then for all ϕ ∈ L∆,M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M
′, s′  ϕ.
Theorem 24 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem for monotonic c-bisimulation). Let M and
M′ be monotonic, ∆-saturated c-models, s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′. If for all ϕ ∈ L∆,
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ, then (M, s)↔sc (M′, s′).
Similarly, we can define regular c-bisimulation, which is obtained by adding the
property (i) into monotonic c-bisimulation, and show the corresponding Hennessy-
Milner Theorem. We omit the details due to space limitation.
6 Quasi-filter structures
We define a class of structures, called ‘quasi-filter structures’.6
Definition 25 (Quasi-filter frames and models). A neighborhood frame F = 〈S,N〉
is a quasi-filter frame, if for all s ∈ S, N(s) possesses the properties (n), (i), (c),
and (ws), where (ws) means being closed under supersets or co-supersets: for all
X,Y, Z ⊆ S,X ∈ N(s) impliesX ∪ Y ∈ N(s) or (S\X) ∪ Z ∈ N(s).
We say a neighborhood model is a quasi-filter model, if its underlying frame is a
quasi-filter frame.
The main result of this section is the following: for CL, every Kripke model has a
pointwise equivalent quasi-filter model, but not vice versa.
Definition 26 (qf-variation). LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 is a Kripke model. qf(M) is said to
be a qf-variation of M, if qf(M) = 〈S, qfN, V 〉, where for any s ∈ S, qfN(s) =
{X ⊆ S : for any t, u ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, then (t ∈ X iff u ∈ X)}.
The definition of qfN is also quite natural, since just as “for any t, u ∈ S, if
sRt and sRu, then (t ∈ X iff u ∈ X)” corresponds to the Kripke semantics of ∆,
X ∈ qfN(s) corresponds to the new neighborhood semantics of the operator, as will
be seen more clearly in Prop. 27. Note that the definition of qfN can be simplified as
follows:
qfN(s) = {X ⊆ S : R(s) ⊆ X or R(s) ⊆ S\X}.
It is easy to see that every Kripke model has a (sole) qf-variation. We will demonstrate
that, every such qf-variation is a quasi-filter model.
The following proposition states that every Kripke model and its qf-variation are
pointwise equivalent.
Proposition 27. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a Kripke model. Then for all ϕ ∈ L∆, for
all s ∈ S, we have M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ qf(M), s  ϕ, i.e., ϕM = ϕqf(M), where
ϕM = {t ∈ S | M, t  ϕ}.
6Note that our notion of quasi-filter is different from that in [2, p. 215], where quasi-filter is defined as
(s) + (i). For example, the latter notion is not necessarily closed under complements.
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Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial case is∆ϕ.
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ for all t, u ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, then
(t ∈ ϕM ⇐⇒ u ∈ ϕM)
IH
⇐⇒ for all t, u ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, then
(t ∈ ϕqf(M) ⇐⇒ u ∈ ϕqf(M))
Def. qfN
⇐⇒ ϕqf(M) ∈ qfN(s)
⇐⇒ qf(M), s  ∆ϕ.
Proposition 28. LetM be a Kripke model. Then qf(M) is a quasi-filter model.
Proof. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉. For any s ∈ S, we show that qf(M) has those four
properties of quasi-filter models.
(n): it is clear that S ∈ qfN(s).
(i): assume that X,Y ∈ qfN(s), we showX ∩ Y ∈ qfN(s). By assumption, for
all s, t ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, then t ∈ X iff u ∈ X , and for all s, t ∈ S, if sRt and
sRu, then t ∈ Y iff u ∈ Y . Therefore, for all t, u ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, we have that
t ∈ X ∩ Y iff u ∈ X ∩ Y . This entailsX ∩ Y ∈ qfN(s).
(c): assume that X ∈ qfN(s), to show S\X ∈ qfN(s). By assumption, for all
s, t ∈ S, if sRt and sRu, then t ∈ X iff u ∈ X . Thus for all s, t ∈ S, if sRt and sRu,
then t ∈ S\X iff u ∈ S\X , i.e., S\X ∈ qfN(s).
(ws): assume, for a contradiction, that for some X,Y, Z ⊆ S it holds that X ∈
qfN(s) but X ∪ Y /∈ qfN(s) and (S\X) ∪ Z /∈ qfN(s). W.l.o.g. we assume that
there are t1, u1 such that sRt1, sRu1 and t1 ∈ X ∪ Y but u1 /∈ X ∪ Y , and there are
t2, u2 such that sRt2, sRu2 and t2 /∈ (S\X) ∪ Z but u2 ∈ (S\X) ∪ Z . Then t2 ∈ X
and u1 /∈ X , which is contrary to the fact thatX ∈ qfN(s) and sRu1, sRt2.
The following result is immediate by Props. 27 and 28.
Corollary 29. For CL, every Kripke model has a pointwise equivalent quasi-filter
model.
However, for CL, not every quasi-filter model has a pointwise equivalent Kripke
model. The point is that quasi-filter models may not be closed under infinite (i.e. arbit-
rary) intersections (see the property (r) in Def. 1).
Proposition 30. For CL, there is a quasi-filter model that has no pointwise equivalent
Kripke model.
Proof. Consider an infinite modelM = 〈S,N, V 〉, where
• S = N,
• for all s ∈ S, N(s) = {S, ∅, {2n for some n ∈ N}, S\{2n for some n ∈
N},
⋂
fin S\{2n for some n ∈ N},
⋃
fin{2n for some n ∈ N}},
7
• V (p) = {2n | n ∈ N}, V (pm) = {m} for allm ∈ N.
7
⋃
fin{2n for some n ∈ N} denotes the union of finitely many sets of the form {2n for some n ∈ N},
e.g. {0} ∪ {2} ∪ {4}.
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It is not hard to check thatM is a quasi-filter model.8 Note that for all s ∈ S, pM /∈
N(s), thusM, s 6 ∆p. In particular,M, 0 6 ∆p.
Suppose that there is a pointwise equivalent Kripke modelM′, thenM′, 0 2 ∆p.
Thus there must be 2m and 2n+ 1 that are accessible from 0, wherem,n ∈ N. Since
pM
′
2m = p
M
2m = {2m}, thusM
′, 0 2 ∆p2m.
However, since pM2m = {2m} ∈ N(0), we obtainM, 0  ∆p2m, which is contrary
to the supposition andM′, 0 2 ∆p2m, as desired.
However, when we restrict quasi-filter models to finite cases, the situation will be
different.
Proposition 31. For every finite quasi-filter modelM, there exists a pointwise equi-
valent Kripke modelM′, that is, for all ϕ ∈ L∆, for all worlds s, M′, s  ϕ ⇐⇒
M, s  ϕ, i.e., ϕM
′
 = ϕM.
Proof. LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 be a quasi-filter model. DefineM′ = 〈S,R, V 〉, where R
is defined as follows: for any s, t ∈ S,
sRt ⇐⇒ t ∈ X for someX ∈ N(s) and {t} /∈ N(s).
We will show that for all ϕ ∈ L∆ and all s ∈ S, we have that
M′, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ.
The proof proceeds with induction on ϕ ∈ L∆. The nontrivial case is ∆ϕ, that is
to show,M′, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ∆ϕ.
“⇐=:” Suppose, for a contradiction, that M, s  ∆ϕ, but M′, s 2 ∆ϕ. Then
ϕM ∈ N(s), and there are t, u ∈ S such that sRt and sRu and M′, t  ϕ and
M′, u 2 ϕ. Since ϕM ∈ N(s), by (c), we get S\ϕM ∈ N(s); moreover, by (ws),
we obtain that ϕM ∪ {u} ∈ N(s) or S\ϕM ∪ {t} ∈ N(s). If ϕM ∪ {u} ∈ N(s),
then by S\ϕM ∈ N(s) and (i), we derive that (ϕM ∪ {u}) ∩ S\ϕM ∈ N(s), i.e.,
{u}∩S\ϕM ∈ N(s), by induction hypothesis, {u} = {u}∩S\ϕM
′
 ∈ N(s), contrary
to sRu and the definition of R. If S\ϕM ∪ {t} ∈ N(s), similarly we can show that
{t} ∈ N(s), contrary to sRt and the definition of R.
“=⇒:” Suppose that M, s 6 ∆ϕ, to show that M′, s 2 ∆ϕ, that is, there are
t, u ∈ S such that sRt, sRu andM′, t  ϕ andM′, u  ¬ϕ. By supposition, ϕM /∈
N(s). By (n) and (c), S ∈ N(s) and ∅ ∈ N(s).
Now consider the truth set of ϕ in M, namely, ϕM = {x ∈ S | M, x  ϕ}.
Clearly, ϕM 6= S and ϕM 6= ∅. We show that there is a t ∈ ϕM such that
{t} /∈ N(s) as follows: if not, i.e., for all t ∈ ϕM we have {t} ∈ N(s), then by
(c), we get S\{t} ∈ N(s), and using (i) we obtain
⋂
t∈ϕM S\{t} ∈ N(s), viz.
S\ϕM ∈ N(s).9 Therefore using (c) again, we conclude that ϕM ∈ N(s), which
contradicts with the supposition and induction hypothesis.
8To verify (ws), we need only show the nontrivial case
⋃
fin{2n for some n ∈ N}. For this, we show a
stronger result: for all Z ⊆ S,
⋂
fin S\{2n for some n ∈ N}∪Z ∈ N(s). The cases for Z = S orZ = ∅
are clear. For other cases, we partition the elements in Z into three disjoint (possibly empty) parts: odd
numbers, even numbers in
⋃
fin{2n for some n ∈ N}, even numbers in
⋂
fin S\{2n for some n ∈ N}.
Note that the first and third parts all belong to
⋂
fin S\{2n for some n ∈ N}; moreover, the union of the
second part and
⋂
fin S\{2n for some n ∈ N} is also inN(s).
9Since M is finite, we need only use the property that N is closed under finite intersections, which is
equivalent to the property (i). This is unlike the case in Prop. 30.
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Therefore, there is a t ∈ ϕM such that {t} /∈ N(s). Since t ∈ S and S ∈ N(s),
by the definition of R, it follows that sRt; furthermore, from t ∈ ϕM and induction
hypothesis, it follows thatM′, t  ϕ.
Similarly, we can show that there is a u ∈ (¬ϕ)M
′
 such that {u} /∈ N(s). Thus
sRu andM′, u  ¬ϕ, as desired.
In spite of Prop. 30, as we shall see in Coro. 42, logical consequence relations
over Kripke semantics and over the new neighborhood semantics on quasi-filter models
coincide with each other forCL.
7 qf -Bisimulation
This section proposes the notion of bisimulation forCL over quasi-filter models, called
‘qf -bisimulation’. The intuitive idea of the notion is similar to monotonic c-bisimulation
and c-bisimulation, i.e. the notion of precocongruences with particular properties (in
the current setting, those four properties of quasi-filter models).
Definition 32 (qf-bisimulation). LetM = 〈S,N, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, N ′, V ′〉 be quasi-
filter models. A nonempty relation Z ⊆ S × S′ is a qf-bisimulation betweenM and
M′, if for all (s, s′) ∈ Z ,
(qi) s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ Prop;
(qii) if the pair (U,U ′) is Z-coherent, then U ∈ N(s) iff U ′ ∈ N ′(s′).
We say (M, s) and (M′, s′) are qf-bisimilar, written (M, s) ↔qf (M′, s′), if
there is a qf-bisimulation Z betweenM andM′ such that (s, s′) ∈ Z .
Note that the notion of qf -bisimulation is defined between quasi-filter models. It is
clear that every qf-bisimulation is a c-bisimulation, but it is not necessarily a monotonic
c-bisimulation, since it is easy to find a quasi-filter model which is not closed under
supersets.
Analogous to the case for c-bisimulation in Sec. 4, we can show that
Proposition 33. Let M, M′ be both quasi-filter models, s ∈ M, s′ ∈ M′. If
(M, s)↔qf (M′, s′), then for all ϕ ∈ L∆,M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ.
Theorem 34 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem for qf-bisimulation). LetM andM′ be ∆-
saturated quasi-filter models, and s ∈ M, s′ ∈ M′. If for all ϕ ∈ L∆, M, s 
ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ, then (M, s)↔qf (M′, s′).
We conclude this section with a comparison between the notion of qf-bisimulation
and that of rel-∆-bisimulation in [1, Def. 6].
Definition 35 (rel-∆-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be
Kripke models. A nonempty relation Z ⊆ S × S′ is a rel-∆-bisimulation betweenM
andM′, if for all (s, s′) ∈ Z ,
(Atoms) s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ Prop;
(Coherence) if the pair (U,U ′) is Z-coherent, then
(R(s) ⊆ U or R(s) ⊆ S\U) iff (R′(s′) ⊆ U ′ or R′(s′) ⊆ S′\U ′).
We say (M, s) and (M′, s′) are rel-∆-bisimilar, written (M, s) ↔rel (M
′, s′), if
there is a rel-∆-bisimulation Z betweenM andM′ such that (s, s′) ∈ Z .
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The result below asserts that every rel-∆-bisimulation between Kripke models can
be transformed as a qf-bisimulation between quasi-filter models.
Proposition 36. LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 andM′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be Kripke models. If Z is
a rel-∆-bisimulation betweenM andM′, then Z is a qf-bisimulation between qf(M)
and qf(M′).
Proof. SupposeZ is a rel-∆-bisimulation betweenM andM′. By Prop. 28, qf(M) and
qf(M′) are both quasi-filter models. It suffices to show that Z satisfies the two condi-
tions of a qf-bisimulation. For this, assume that (s, s′) ∈ Z . (qi) is clear from (Atoms).
For (qii): let (U,U ′) be Z-coherent. We have the following line of argument-
ation: U ∈ qfN(s) iff (by definition of qfN ) (R(s) ⊆ U or R(s) ⊆ S\U) iff
(by Coherence) (R′(s′) ⊆ U ′ or R′(s′) ⊆ S′\U ′) iff (by definition of qfN ′) U ′ ∈
qfN ′(s′).
We do not know whether the converse of Prop. 36 also holds in the current stage.
Note that this is important, since if it holds, then we can see clearly the essence of
rel-∆-bisimulation, i.e. precocongruences with those four quasi-filter properties. We
leave it for future work.
8 Frame definability
Recall that under the old neighborhood semantics, all the ten neighborhood properties
in Def. 1 are undefinable in L∆. In contrast, under the new semantics, almost all these
properties are definable in the same language. The following witnesses the properties
and the corresponding formulas defining them. Recall that (c) is the minimal condition
of neighborhood frames.
(n) ∆⊤ (i) ∆p ∧∆q → ∆(p ∧ q)
(s) ∆(p ∧ q)→ ∆p ∧∆q (c) ∆p↔ ∆¬p
(d) ∇p (t) ∆p→ p
(b) p→ ∆∇p (4) ∆p→ ∆∆p
(5) ∇p→ ∆∇p
Proposition 37. The right-hand formulas define the corresponding left-hand proper-
ties.
Proof. By Prop. 5, ∆p ↔ ∆¬p defines (c). For other properties, we take (d) and (b)
as examples, which resort to the property (c). Given any c-frame F = 〈S,N〉.
Suppose that F has (d), to show that F  ∇p. Assume, for a contradiction that
there is a valuation V on F , and s ∈ S, such thatM, s 6 ∇p, whereM = 〈F , V 〉.
Then pM ∈ N(s). On the one hand, by supposition, S\pM /∈ N(s); one the other
hand, by (c), S\pM ∈ N(s), contradiction. Conversely, assume that F does not
have (d), to show that F 6 ∇p. By assumption, there is an X such that X ∈
N(s) and S\X ∈ N(s). Define a valuation V on F such that V (p) = X , and
letM = 〈F , V 〉. Thus pM ∈ N(s), i.e.,M, s  ∆p, and henceM, s 6 ∇p.
Suppose F has (b), to show F  p → ∆∇p. For this, given anyM = 〈S,N, V 〉
and s ∈ S, assume thatM, s  p, then s ∈ pM. By supposition, {u ∈ S | S\pM /∈
N(u)} ∈ N(s). By (c), this is equivalent to that {u ∈ S | pM /∈ N(u)} ∈ N(s),
i.e., {u ∈ S | M, u  ∇p} ∈ N(s), viz., (∇p)M ∈ N(s), thus M, s  ∆∇p.
Conversely, suppose F does not have (b), to show F 6 p → ∆∇p. By supposition,
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there is an s ∈ S and X ⊆ S, such that s ∈ X and {u ∈ S | S\X /∈ N(u)} /∈ N(s).
Define a valuationV onF such that V (p) = X , and letM = 〈F , V 〉. ThenM, s  p,
and {u ∈ S | S\pM /∈ N(u)} /∈ N(s). By (c) again, this means that {u ∈ S | pM /∈
N(u)} /∈ N(s), that is, {u ∈ S | M, u  ∇p} /∈ N(s), i.e., (∇p)M /∈ N(s),
thereforeM, s 6 ∆∇p.
The following result will be used in the next section.
Proposition 38. ∆p → ∆(p → q) ∨ ∆(¬p → r) defines the property (ws), where
(ws) is as defined in Def. 25.
Proof. Let F = 〈S,N〉 be a neighborhood frame.
First suppose F has (ws), we need to show F  ∆p→ ∆(p→ q) ∨∆(¬p→ r).
For this, assume for any model M based on F and s ∈ S that M, s  ∆p. Then
pM ∈ N(s). By supposition, pM ∪ rM ∈ N(s) or (¬p)M ∪ qM ∈ N(s). The
former implies (¬p → r)M ∈ N(s), thus M, s  ∆(¬p → r); the latter implies
(p → q)M ∈ N(s), thusM, s  ∆(p → q). Either case impliesM, s  ∆(p →
q) ∨ ∆(¬p → r), hence M, s  ∆p → ∆(p → q) ∨ ∆(¬p → r). Therefore
F  ∆p→ ∆(p→ q) ∨∆(¬p→ r).
Conversely, suppose F does not have (ws), we need to show F 6 ∆p → ∆(p →
q) ∨∆(¬p→ r). From the supposition, it follows that there areX , Y and Z such that
X ∈ N(s), X ⊆ Y and Y /∈ N(s), S\X ⊆ Z and Z /∈ N(s). Define V as a valuation
on F such that V (p) = X , V (q) = Z and V (r) = Y . Since pM = V (p) ∈ N(s),
we have M, s  ∆p. Since X ⊆ Y , (¬p → r)M = X ∪ Y = Y /∈ N(s), thus
M, s 6 ∆(¬p → r). Since S\X ⊆ Z , (p → q)M = (S\X) ∪ Z = Z /∈ N(s),
and thusM, s 6 ∆(p → q). HenceM, s 6 ∆p → ∆(p → q) ∨∆(¬p → r), and
therefore F 6 ∆p→ ∆(p→ q) ∨∆(¬p→ r).
Note that in the above proposition, we do not use the property (c), that is to say, it
holds for the class of all neighborhood frames.
9 Axiomatizations
This section presents axiomatizations of L∆ over various classes of frames. The min-
imal system E∆ consists of the following axiom schemas and inference rule.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
∆Equ ∆ϕ↔ ∆¬ϕ
RE∆
ϕ↔ ψ
∆ϕ↔ ∆ψ
Note that E∆ is the same as CCL in [4, Def. 7]. Recall that (c) is the minimal
neighborhood property.
Theorem 39. E∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of c-frames.
Proof. Immediate by the soundness and strong completeness of E∆ w.r.t. the class of
all neighborhood frames under  [4, Thm. 1] and Coro. 10.
Now consider the following extensions of E∆, which are sound and strongly com-
plete with respect to the corresponding frame classes. We omit the proof detail since it
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is straightforward.
notation axioms systems frame classes
∆M ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ M∆ = E∆ +∆M cs
∆C ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) R∆ =M∆ +∆C csi
One may ask the following question: is R∆ + ∆⊤ sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of filters, i.e. the frame classes possessing (s), (i), (n)? The
answer is negative, since the soundness fails, although it is indeed sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of filters satisfying (c).
Now consider the following axiomatization K∆, which is provably equivalent to
CL in [5, Def. 4.1].
Definition 40 (Axiomatic system K∆). The axiomatic system K∆ is the extension of
E∆ plus the following axiom schemas:
∆Top ∆⊤
∆Con ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ)
∆Dis ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ→ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ→ χ)
Theorem 41. K∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of quasi-
filter frames.
Proof. Soundness is immediate by frame definability results of the four axioms.
For strong completeness, since every K∆-consistent set is satisfiable in a Kripke
model (cf. e.g. [5]), by Coro. 29, every K∆-consistent is satisfiable in a quasi-filter
model, thus also satisfiable in a quasi-filter frame.
Note that the strong completeness of E∆ and of K∆ can be shown directly, by
defining the canonical neighborhood functionN c(s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∈ s}.
As claimed at the end of Sec. 6, for CL, although not every quasi-filter model
has a pointwise equivalent Kripke model, logical consequence relations over Kripke
semantics and over the new neighborhood semantics on quasi-filter models coincide
with each other. Now we are ready to show this claim.
Corollary 42. The logical consequence relations qf and  coincide for CL. That
is, for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L∆, Γ qf ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ  ϕ, where, by Γ qf ϕ we mean that,
for every quasi-filter modelM and s inM, ifM, s  Γ, thenM, s  ϕ. Therefore,
for all ϕ ∈ L∆, qf ϕ ⇐⇒  ϕ, i.e., the new semantics over quasi-filter models has
the same logic (valid formulas) on CL as the Kripke semantics.
Proof. By the soundness and strong completeness of K∆ with respect to the class of
all Kripke frames (cf. e.g. [5]), Γ ⊢K∆ ϕ iff Γ  ϕ. Then using Thm. 41, we have that
Γ qf ϕ iff Γ  ϕ.
10 Conclusion and Discussions
In this paper, we proposed a new neighborhood semantics for contingency logic, which
simplifies the original neighborhood semantics in [4] but keeps the logic the same. This
new perspective enables us to define the notions of bisimulation for contingency logic
over various model classes, one of which can help us understand the essence of nbh-∆-
bisimulation, and obtain the corresponding Hennessy-Milner Theorems, in a relatively
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easy way. Moreover, we showed that for this logic, almost all the ten neighborhood
properties, which are undefinable under the old semantics, are definable under the new
one. And we also had some simple results on axiomatizations. Besides, under the new
semantics, contingency logic has the same expressive power as standard modal logic.
We conjecture that our method may apply to other non-normal modal logics, such as
logics of unknown truths and of false beliefs. We leave it for future work.
Another future work would be axiomatizations of monotonic contingency logic
and regular contingency logic under the old neighborhood semantics. Note that our
axiomatizations M∆ and R∆ are not able to be transformed into the corresponding
axiomatizations under the old semantics, since our underlying frames are c-frames.
For example, although we do have cs ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) → ∆ϕ ∧ ∆ψ, we do not have s
∆(ϕ ∧ ψ) → ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ; consequently, althoughM∆ is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of cs-frames under the new neighborhood semantics, it is not
sound with respect to the class of s-frames under the old one. Thus the axiomatizations
of these logics under the old neighborhood semantics are still open.10
References
[1] Z. Bakhtiari, H. van Ditmarsch, and H. H. Hansen. Neighbourhood contingency
bisimulation. In Indian Conference on Logic and Its Applications, pages 48–63.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2017, January.
[2] B. F. Chellas. Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 1980.
[3] J. Fan. A sequence of neighborhood contingency logics, 2017. Under submission.
[4] J. Fan and H. van Ditmarsch. Neighborhood contingency logic. In M. Banerjee
and S. Krishna, editors, Logic and Its Application, volume 8923 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 88–99. Springer, 2015.
[5] J. Fan, Y. Wang, and H. van Ditmarsch. Contingency and knowing whether. The
Review of Symbolic Logic, 8(1):75–107, 2015.
[6] T. Gu and Y. Wang. ‘knowing value’ logic as a normal modal logic. In Advances
in Modal Logic, volume 11, pages 362–381, 2016.
[7] H. H. Hansen. Monotonic modal logics. Institute for Logic, Language and Com-
putation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, 2003.
[8] H. H. Hansen, C. Kupke, and E. Pacuit. Neighbourhood structures: Bisimilarity
and basic model theory. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 5(2:2):1–38,
2009.
[9] L. Humberstone. The logic of non-contingency. Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 36(2):214–229, 1995.
[10] S. Kuhn. Minimal non-contingency logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,
36(2):230–234, 1995.
[11] H. Montgomery and R. Routley. Contingency and non-contingency bases for
normal modal logics. Logique et Analyse, 9:318–328, 1966.
10Update: These two open questions have been answered in [3].
16
[12] W. van der Hoek and A. Lomuscio. A logic for ignorance. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 85(2):117–133, 2004.
[13] Y. Wang and J. Fan. Conditionally knowing what. In Advances in Modal Logic,
volume 10, pages 569–587. College Publications.
[14] Y. Wang and J. Fan. Knowing that, knowing what, and public communication:
Public announcement logic with Kv operators. In Proc. of 23rd IJCAI, pages
1147–1154, 2013.
[15] E. Zolin. Completeness and definability in the logic of noncontingency. Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(4):533–547, 1999.
17
